Health care up to 1970 was scarce and limited. Before 1958, Oman had two hospitals; one was opened in 1935 by the American Arabian Mission and was named the Knox Memorial Hospital while the other was established in 1948. The latter received partial financing from the Sultan at the time and was staffed and administered by the British Consulate.2 People had to travel up to four days just to reach a hospital, where hundreds of patients would already be waiting in line to see one of the few (expatriate) doctors.3 At that time, only 13 physicians served the entire nation, implying a physician-population ratio of 1 per 50,000. Morbidity and mortality rates were very high. One out of every eight infants born alive died before reaching their first birthday, and one out of every five died before reaching the age of 5 years. Out of every three people in the population, one had an episode of malaria, and out of every thousand persons, thirty were reported to be infected with trachoma, eight with pulmonary tuberculosis and six with hepatitis. The average life expectancy was only 49.3 years in 1970.4
FNM Report 1 15 2010
The institutional organisation of the MOH is relatively centralised with three under-secretaries responsible for administrative/financial affairs, health services and planning reporting directly to the Minister.24 The MOH has, however, pursued a decentralisation process since 1990. A Directorate General of Health Services was established in each of the ten health regions (now eleven). Delegation of responsibilities, financial and administrative as well as decision-making was gradually devolved to health regions. Decentralisation has also been in effect at the wilayat (district) level since 1993.7 This approach to decentralisation has allowed the MOH to delegate necessary authorities and responsibilities to regional and wilayat levels. This has encouraged local initiatives and enabled local planning, and budget control.18 Furthermore, the wilayat health level, matching as it does the administrative level of local government, has a pivotal role in addressing determinants of health. It provides the ideal platform for inter-sectoral collaboration on a broader health agenda where the determinants of health need to be addressed by a multiplicity of agencies and the wider community. The Wilayat Health Committees, established in 1999 in all wilayats and chaired by the Wali (local governor) provide, in principle, the main forum for supporting the multi-sectoral and community-based activities of the MOH and inducting community support group volunteers, whose main orientation is towards health education in the community.25 Several community-based initiatives such as the Healthy Wilayat Project, Healthy Lifestyle Project, Healthy City and Healthy Village projects were recently implemented in order to help increase the awareness of the respective communities about environmental and health problems, and thus create active community involvement and ownership for health actions.11
Note: The credit report will indicate if a credit score could not be produced due to insufficient credit. The credit report must be maintained in the loan file, whether the report includes traditional credit and a credit score or indicates that a credit score could not be produced due to insufficient or frozen credit.
Credit scores are not an integral part of DU's risk assessment because DU performs its own analysis of the credit report data. However, lenders must request credit scores for each borrower from each of the three credit repositories when they order the three in-file merged credit report, described in B3-5.2-01, Requirements for Credit Reports. If one or two of the credit repositories do not contain any credit information for the borrowers who have traditional credit, the credit report is still acceptable as long as
Note: When a loan casefile is submitted to DU for a borrower with a credit score, but only medical tradelines are reported on the credit report, the loan casefile will receive an Out of Scope recommendation. The lender can manually underwrite the loan casefile in accordance with the Selling Guide.
The debt limit does not restrict Congress’s ability to enact spending and revenue legislation that affects the level of debt or otherwise constrains fiscal policy; it restricts Treasury’s authority to borrow to finance the decisions already enacted by Congress and the President. Congress also usually votes on increasing the debt limit after fiscal policy decisions affecting federal borrowing have begun to take effect. This approach to raising the debt limit does not facilitate debate over specific tax or spending proposals and their effect on debt. In February 2011, GAO reported, and continues to believe, that Congress should consider ways to better link decisions about the debt limit with decisions about spending and revenue to avoid potential disruptions to the Treasury market and to help inform the fiscal policy debate in a timely way.
GAO previously examined challenges associated with managing cash and debt when delays in raising the debt limit occurred, focusing on the period from 1995 through 2010. In February 2011, GAO reported that delays in raising the debt limit create debt and cash challenges for Treasury, and these challenges have been exacerbated in recent years by a large growth in debt.
Delays in raising the debt limit occurred during 2011 and January 2012. GAO has prepared this report because of the nature of, and sensitivity toward, actions taken to manage federal debt during such delays. With regard to actions taken by Treasury during 2011 and January 2012 to manage federal debt when delays in raising the debt limit occurred, this report provides (1) a chronology of the significant events, (2) an analysis of whether actions taken by Treasury were consistent with legal authorities provided to manage federal debt during such delays, (3) an assessment of the extent to which Treasury restored uninvested principal and interest losses to federal government accounts in accordance with relevant legislation, and (4) an analysis of the effect that delays in raising the debt limit had on Treasury’s borrowing costs and operations. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed Treasury correspondence and other documentation, analyzed Treasury and private security yield data, and interviewed Treasury officials. In commenting on GAO’s draft report, Treasury broadly agreed with GAO’s conclusions and provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
(d) To implement the ALARA requirements of 20.1101 (b), and notwithstanding the requirements in 20.1301 of this part, a constraint on air emissions of radioactive material to the environment, excluding Radon-222 and its daughters, shall be established by licensees other than those subject to 50.34a, such that the individual member of the public likely to receive the highest dose will not be expected to receive a total effective dose equivalent in excess of 10 mrem (0.1 mSv) per year from these emissions. If a licensee subject to this requirement exceeds this dose constraint, the licensee shall report the exceedance as provided in 20.2203 and promptly take appropriate corrective action to ensure against recurrence.
(d) If the licensee chooses to assess intakes of Class Y material using the measurements given in 20.1204(a)(2) or (3), the licensee may delay the recording and reporting of the assessments for periods up to 7 months, unless otherwise required by 20.2202 or 20.2203, in order to permit the licensee to make additional measurements basic to the assessments.
(b) (1) Waste oils (petroleum derived or synthetic oils used principally as lubricants, coolants, hydraulic or insulating fluids, or metalworking oils) that have been radioactively contaminated in the course of the operation or maintenance of a nuclear power reactor licensed under part 50 of this chapter may be incinerated on the site where generated provided that the total radioactive effluents from the facility, including the effluents from such incineration, conform to the requirements of appendix I to part 50 of this chapter and the effluent release limits contained in applicable license conditions other than effluent limits specifically related to incineration of waste oil. The licensee shall report any changes or additions to the information supplied under 50.34 and 50.34a of this chapter associated with this incineration pursuant to 50.71 of this chapter, as appropriate. The licensee shall also follow the procedures of 50.59 of this chapter with respect to such changes to the facility or procedures.
(3) Obtain reports of the individual's dose equivalent(s) from the most recent employer for work involving radiation exposure, or the individual's current employer (if the individual is not employed by the licensee) by telephone, telegram, electronic media, or letter. The licensee shall request a written verification of the dose data if the authenticity of the transmitted report cannot be established.
(d) The licensee shall record the exposure history of each individual, as required by paragraphs (a) or (b) of this section, on NRC Form 4, or other clear and legible record, including all of the information required by NRC Form 4.4 The form or record must show each period in which the individual received occupational exposure to radiation or radioactive material and must be signed by the individual who received the exposure. For each period for which the licensee obtains reports, the licensee shall use the dose shown in the report in preparing the NRC Form 4. For any period in which the licensee does not obtain a report, the licensee shall place a notation on the NRC Form 4 indicating the periods of time for which data are not available.
(b) Written reports. (1) Each licensee required to make a report under paragraph (a) of this section shall, within 30 days after making the telephone report, make a written report setting forth the following information: 2ff7e9595c
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